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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Dennis Smith served several years on a largely successful probation. While four
of those years were served under a withheld judgment, eighteen months were served
under a pronounced sentence. Pursuant to I.C. § 18-309, which governs the award for
credit for time served, Mr. Smith should at least be credited for the time he successfully
served his probation with a pronounced sentence pending, as that time is not properly
included in the period for which the district court may deny credit. This is because while
Mr. Smith was serving that time on probation, he was not "at large," and under the
proper interpretation of the statute, only the time during which he was "at large" may be
discredited.

That interpretation is based on the proper application of the rules of

statutory construction, which includes grammar rules.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the district court's order denying credit for
that time and remand for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2003, Mr. Smith was charged with forgery and misdemeanor possession of
marijuana. (R., pp.37-38.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pied guilty to the forgery
charge and the possession charge was dismissed. (R., p.50.) On December 3, 2003,
the district court withheld judgment for a five-year period of probation. (R., pp.50-51.)
Some three years later, on December 5, 2006, the State filed a Motion for Summons for
Probation Violation.

(R., pp.56-57.) However, it later moved to dismiss the violation,

and on February 22, 2007, Mr. Smith was returned to probation. (R., p.68.)
Mr. Smith was able to comply with the terms of his probation until November 13,
2007, when he was alleged to have violated his probation by committing new crimes.
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(See, e.g., R., p.101.) He admitted his violation of the terms of his probation, and on
April 21, 2008, the district court revoked his withheld judgment and imposed a five-year
unified sentence, with two years fixed.

(R., p.115.)

However, it suspended that

sentence and reinstated his probation for a period of five years, imposing some
additional terms for that period of probation. (R., pp.115-16.)
Another set of violations was alleged to have occurred on April 17, 2009.
(R., p.134-36.)

After Mr. Smith admitted to some of the violations, the district court

revoked his probation. (R., pp.143-44.) It did, however, retain jurisdiction. (R., p.144.)
Mr. Smith performed well during his period of retained jurisdiction, and so was returned
to probation on January 14, 2010.

(R., pp.148-50.)

However, another motion for

probation violation was filed on September 1, 2010. (R., p.168.)

Mr. Smith filed a

motion for early release on October 18, 2010, arguing that the seven and one-half years
he had served on probation exceeded his five-year unified term. (R., p.176.) On that
motion, the district court wrote "Denied. Deborah A Bail, District Judge." (R., p.176.)
The district court subsequently revoked Mr. Smith's probation and executed his
sentence.

(R., pp.180-81.)

It did, however, credit him with 583 days against that

sentence. (R., p.183.)
Nearly a year later, Mr. Smith filed a motion for credit for time served, requesting
583 days for the time he served during his period of retained jurisdiction, 33 days
for time he spent incarcerated at the discretion of his probation officer, and 72 months
(6 years) for the time he had served while on probation. (R., pp.185-87.) That motion
bears a filing stamp dated October 27, 2011, indicating it doubles as an order.
(R., p.185.) It also bears the district court's name and title, dated October 26, 2011.

2

(R., p.185.) That handwritten notation does not, however, indicate whether the motion

was granted or denied. (See R., p.185.)
Mr. Smith did, however, appeal from that order, indicating that it was denied.
(R., p.195.) That notice of appeal was timely from the date on the filing stamp labeled

"Order." (R., p.195.) Mr. Smith also filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter,
Rule 35), indicating that the denial of credit for the time he served on probation made
his sentence illegal in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights, as well as
Idaho statutes, an argument he explained in the accompanying brief. (R., pp.227-47.)
The district court wrote on the first page "Denied. Untimely. Deborah A. Bail, District
Judge." (R., p.227.)

3

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Smith credit for the time he served
on probation.

2.

Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Smith's Rule 35 motion and
failed to provide an adequate record in regard to its denials of his Rule 35 motion
and motion for credit for time served.

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Smith Credit For The
Time He Served On Probation

A.

Introduction
At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-309, which

dictates when credit is to be awarded against a sentence. That code section provides:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, [sic] shall receive credit in the judgment for any
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was
for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be
computed as part of such term.
I.C. § 18-309. 1 The statute, as it is currently written, does not specifically include or
exclude periods of time when the defendant is on probation and adhering to the terms
thereof. It does, however, explicitly exclude periods during which the defendant is "at
large," which, in this context, is commonly understood to be absconding from probation.
Therefore, the statute is ambiguous as to whether credit may be awarded for periods
when the defendant is serving probation and adhering to the terms thereof.
Based on the canons of statutory construction, which include the use of
commonly-understood definitions for terms, as well as the use of grammar rules, the
intent of the statute is revealed to intend credit to be awarded for such compliance with

1

Mr. Smith recognizes that the period of time that he served on probation pursuant to
a withheld judgment may not fall into "the remainder of the term," as his sentence had
not been pronounced at that time. See I.C. § 19-2601 (3). As such, he recognizes that
period of time may be excluded from the credit calculation.
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probationary terms. Therefore, the district court erred when it declined to award such
credit. This Court should remedy that error.

B.

Courts Must Adhere To The Rules Of Statutory Construction. Including Grammar
Rules. In Order To Preserve The Constitutional Separation Of Powers With The
Legislature
Three provisions in the Idaho Constitution define the separation of powers

between the three branches of government:

Article 2 § 1; Article 3 § 1; and Article

3 § 15. Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664 (1990). The powers of government are
intentionally split between the branches of government. IDAHO CONST., Art. II § 1. The
Legislature is empowered to pass bills. IDAHO CONST., Art. Ill § 1. And no laws are to
be passed except by bill.

IDAHO CONST., Art. Ill § 15.

Read together, these three

constitutional provisions mean that only the Legislature is empowered to make "law."

Mead, 117 Idaho at 664. In contrast, the Judiciary's duty is to interpret the law made by
the Legislature. Id. Even if the statute, as written, is socially or otherwise unsound, the
Legislature, not the Judiciary, is empowered to correct it.

State v. Schwartz, 139

Idaho 360, 362 (2003). Even if the statute is unambiguous but produces absurd results,
the courts are powerless to interpret it so as to avoid the absurd results caused by the
unambiguous interpretation. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151
Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011 ).

'"The public policy of legislative enactments cannot be

questioned by the courts and avoided simply because the courts might not agree with
the public policy so announced."' Id. (quoting State v. Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho
513, 525 (1953)).

As such, it is the Judiciary's job to simply interpret the statutes

enacted by the Legislature and derive its intent behind those statutes. See id.
In making such interpretations, the Judiciary has several canons of statutory
construction which guide its analysis. The primary of these was reaffirmed in Verska:
6

where the statute is unambiguous, the courts are not empowered to do anything
but adhere to the unambiguous meaning of the statute. See, e.g., id. Among the other
canons is the requirement that the courts begin an interpretation of a statute by looking
at the literal words used and giving them their plain meanings. Driver v. SI Corp., 139
Idaho 423, 429 (2003); Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Serv. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 404
(1996). In order to help understand the plain meaning, the courts look to the context in
which those words are used. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). Doing so
properly requires the courts to refer to "language canons." See, e.g., James J. Burndly
and Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral

Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005). These language canons refer to grammar
rules which help the court understand the Legislature's choice of words and the
grammatical ordering of those words. Id. They are not policy-driven and are designed
to give effect to the ordinary understanding of the language itself. Id.
The Court of Appeals recently attempted to interpret this statute in State v. Soto,
2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 376, 2-3 (2012), rev. denied. That interpretation is not
binding because the opinion was unpublished and is not to be considered authority.
Therefore, Mr. Smith respectfully requests this Court apply the canons of statutory
construction to give effect to the intent of this statute.

C.

Idaho Code § 18-309 Is Ambiguous In Regard To Whether Credit Is To Be
Granted For Periods When The Defendant Is Not Incarcerated, But Is In
Custody, Adhering To All The Restrictions Associated With Such Custody
As noted, the primary statute governing credit for time served is Idaho

Code § 18-309. It provides that:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, [sic] shall receive credit in the judgment for any
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was
7

for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be
computed as part of such term.
I.C. § 18-309. When interpreting statutes, the courts start with the literal words used,
given their ordinary meanings, and the statute will be construed as a whole.

Grease

Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 584 (2010). If the statute is ambiguous, in that it
has more than one reasonable interpretation, the courts seek to determine the
legislative intent by examining the language used, the reasonableness of the various
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96.
In this case, the statute is ambiguous because it fails to explicitly address
whether credit is appropriately awarded for periods of time when the defendant is in the
custody of the Department of Correction, but not imprisoned, and adhering to all the
terms of such custody. 2 It does, however, explicitly provide that periods of incarceration
are credited and times during which the defendant (who, by a legal means has been
temporarily released) is "at large" are not. I.C. § 18-309.
In regard to those two situations, the statute is not ambiguous. The period of
incarceration is easily determined, as it is the period of time the defendant spends in a
prison or other penal institution. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 413
(2007). The term "at large" is similarly unambiguous, although it is a unique term of art
with its own ordinary definition: "1. Free; unrestrained; not under control <the suspect is

2

The Court of Appeals has recognized that there is a difference between "incarceration"
and "custody." Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869-70 (Ct. App. 2008). For example, a
probationer remains in the custody of the Department of Correction, but is not
incarcerated during the period of probation. I.C. §§ 19-2601 (2), 19-2604.
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still at large>."3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 52 (3d Pocket ed. 2006). Certain terms and
phrases, such as "at large," have developed a specific meaning during the course of
history and the Legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of such definitions when
it uses the term in a statute. 4 See Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212
(2003) (discussing a situation where jurisprudence expanded the definition of the term
in question beyond a common-usage definition for purposes of a specific statute). As
there is such a definition for the term "at large," the Legislature is presumed to have
been aware of it when it used the term in I.C. § 18-309. See id.
This definition of "at large," as one who is free, unrestrained, or not under control,
cannot apply to probationers because, as the United States Supreme Court has long
recognized, "by virtue of their status alone, probationers '"do not enjoy "the absolute
liberty to which every citizen is entitled,"'" justifying the "impos[ition] [of] reasonable
conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens."

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001), in turn quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874

The other definitions apply when the term is used in reference to a non-topical or
unlimited discussion (i.e., at large election, discussion of an issue at large). See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 52.
4 In this regard, Idaho courts have long used the term "at large" to refer to persons not in
custody and whose whereabouts are unknown. See, e.g., Jacobson v. McMi/lian, 64
Idaho 351 (1943) ("to escape and be at large"); State v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653, 655,
658 (Ct. App. 2011) (using "at large" to describe a situation where two accomplices had
not been apprehended and whose whereabouts were unknown in the immediate
aftermath of a crime); see State v. Swisher, 125 Idaho 797, 799 (Ct. App. 1994);
State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 156 (Ct. App. 2003); but see Cornell v. Mason, 46
Idaho 112, 268 P. 8, 11 (1928) ("If [the defendant] is permitted to go at large out of the
jail, except by virtue of a legal order or process, it is an escape."). The Legislature has
also used this term in accordance with this definition: "the court ... must order the
defendant to be brought before it, or if he is at large a warrant for his apprehension may
be issued." I.C. § 19-2715(3) (implying that, when the defendant is in custody, he may
simply be brought before the court, but if he is at large, his whereabouts are unknown
and a warrant is necessary to secure his appearance).
3
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(1987), in turn quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).

It has also

recognized that probation is like incarceration, in that it is a punishment imposed by the
justice system, and like other forms of punishment, restricts the person's freedoms.
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. As such, the sentencing court may impose those restrictive

conditions on the probationer that it deems to be necessary and expedient. I.C. § 192601 (2).

The only major limitation is that the terms must not be impossible for the

probationer to adhere to. See, e.g., State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App.
1997).
As such, probationers, by definition, cannot be free, unrestrained, and not under
control. See, e.g., Samson, 547 U.S. at 848-49; Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; Griffin, 483 at
874; Morrissey408 U.S. at 480; Breeden, 129 Idaho at 816. Mr. Smith's situation was a
perfect example of how a probationer is not free, but is rather restrained and controlled
by the court and Department of Correction. He was subject to at least eleven different
"special conditions" while he was on probation. 5

(Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSI), pp.165-66, 232-33.) 6 He was controlled, in that he had to maintain

full-time employment. (PSI, p.165.) He was required to attend any treatment program
recommended by his probation officer, as well as the Cognitive Self Change program.
(PSI, p.165.)

He was also required to participate in a mental health evaluation and

obtain any additional treatment recommended as a result. (PSI, p.233.) His right to
privacy was also restrained, as he was required to waive his Fourth Amendment

When the district court revoked Mr. Smith's withheld judgment and returned him to
probation, it modified some of the terms of that initial probation and added others.
~See PSI, pp.232-33.)
PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"SmithPSl.pdf." Included in this file is the PSI report as well as all the documents
attached thereto (i.e., police reports, addendums to the PSI).
5
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constitutional rights regarding searches of his person and property. (PSI, p.166.) He
was not free in his use of his money, as he was prohibited from purchasing certain
items, such as firearms, and as he was required to pay all court-imposed costs,
including restitution and the costs for supervision. (PSI, p.166.) He was restricted in
regard to his whereabouts, as he was required to waive extradition and not contest
efforts to return him to Idaho, regardless of whether his absence from the state was
approved by his probation officer. (PSI, p.166.)
Mr. Smith complied with the initial restraints and controls on his freedom
pursuant to his probation and withheld judgment for three to four years. 7 He was also
able to comply with the terms of his probation for a total of approximately eighteen
months after his sentence was pronounced. (See R., pp.115-16, 134-36, 148-50, 168.)
During those periods, Mr. Smith accepted the restrictions to his rights and restraints to
his freedom that are associated with all forms of punishment imposed by the criminal
justice system. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. As such, he was not free, unrestrained,
or not under control due to the terms of his probation.

Therefore, he, like all other

probationers adhering to the terms of their probation, was not "at large" during his
period of probation, based on the ordinary definition of the term. 8

As a result of

There was a violation reported after three years, but proceedings were dismissed by
the State. (R., pp.56-57, 68) Mr. Smith complied with the terms for another year before
the first fully-litigated violation occurred. (See, e.g., R., p.101.)
8 None of the violations which were admitted or proven were for absconding.
The
dismissed charges in 2006 were for failure to pay fines, costs, and restitution (R., p.57.)
Mr. Smith admitted to committing a new crime (petit theft) in 2007. (R., pp.101, 113.)
He did admit to one failure to report in 2007, along with unauthorized termination of
employment. (R., pp.135, 141.) Finally, the State proved that he failed to attend or
complete required classes, frequented a business with alcohol sales as its primary
income, consumed alcohol, committed a new crime (open container), failed to notify his
probation officer of the new citation, and possessed marijuana in 2010. (R., pp.169-70,
178.)
7
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understanding the ordinary definitions of the words used in this part of the statute, it is
unambiguous:

the time during which a defendant is "at large" shall not be credited.

See I.C. § 18-309; Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. It is also unambiguous that, by virtue
of their status, probationers adhering to the terms of their probation cannot be included
in the term "at large" under its ordinary definition. Therefore, the district court's denial of
credit for that time was in error.

D.

The Statute Does Not Prohibit Credit For The Period Of Probation, Based On A
Proper Application Of Grammatical Rules And Because Probation Is Not A
"Temporary" Release
Due to the fact that the defendant, who is in custody but not in prison, and who is

adhering to the terms of his probation, is not expressly excluded or included by the
statute, the statute is at least ambiguous in regard to whether credit is appropriately
awarded for that period of time. Thus, in order to determine the legislative intent of this
statute in that regard, it is necessary to examine the language used, the potential
interpretations, and the policy of the statute. See, e.g., Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96.

1.

Pursuant To Grammar Rules Of Interpretation. The Term "By Any Legal
Means" Cannot Modify The Term "At Large"

The sentence in need of interpretation reads:
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be
computed as part of such term.
I.C. § 18-309. The Court of Appeals attempted to interpret the statute in regard to the
period of time and determined that "the phrase 'by any legal means' modifies 'at large."'

Soto, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 376, pp.2-3.

And because probation is a legal

means, the Soto Court determined that the statute prevented granting credit for time
12

served on probation. Id. Besides being nonbinding, that interpretation is unreasonable
because it does not adhere to the rules of grammar or statutory construction. The term
"by any legal means" is an adverb phrase which modifies "release," and is in the
introductory, dependent clause of the relevant part of the sentence. "At large" is in a
different clause and is part of a restrictive appositive phrase modifying "the time." See
I.C. § 18-309. As such, the term "by any legal means" cannot modify "at large."
The sentence at issue has two independent clauses separated by the
conjunction "and." See I.C. § 18-309. The second clause, starting with "if thereafter," is
a conditional independent clause, and it addresses when credit is properly denied. 9
See id.

In order to fully understand this clause, it is necessary to identify therein the

various modifiers and their objects. The basic sentence is actually "If the defendant is
released and returned, the time must not be computed as part of such term." See id. At
first glance, this would seem to support the Soto Court's interpretation, but a proper
analysis of the various modifiers that the Legislature added to this basic sentence
reveals that interpretation was, in fact, incorrect.
First, the term "release" is the object of four different adverbs and adverb
phrases: "during such term" (when the defendant is released), "by any legal means"
(how the defendant is released), 10 "temporarily" (how long the defendant is released),

9

It is "conditional" in the sense that it provides that the time credited against the
imposed sentence will stop being counted if a certain set of conditions comes to pass.
See I.C. § 18-309. As such, it also implies that if the set of conditions does not arise,
the time served continues to count against the sentence. See id.
10 This modifier is actually misplaced, which IT.lay have contributed to the Soto Court's
misinterpretation of the statute. Were it properly placed, it would either be after the first
auxiliary in the verb phrase (i.e., "the defendant is by any legal means temporarily
released") or after the entire verb phrase (i.e., "the defendant is temporarily released by
any legal means"). THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE, 10.40(a) at 174-75
(Bryan A. Garner, et al., 2d ed. 2006). The reason it should have been placed in those
13

and "from such imprisonment" (from where the defendant is released). See id. Second,
the term "returned" is modified by its own pair of adverbs: "subsequently" (when the
defendant is returned), and "thereto" (to where the defendant is returned). 11

The

remaining language, "during which he was at large," is a restrictive appositive phrase,
which modifies "the time." THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE 1.6(c) at 6-7 (Bryan

A. Garner, et al., 2d ed. 2006). As an appositive phrase, it could be removed without
changing the overall meaning of the sentence (i.e., there is some time which is not to be
credited). See REDBOOK, 1.6(a) at 6. However, the phrase serves to provide additional
information about the term which it modifies.

REDBOOK, 1.6(a) at 6.

Because this

information is essential to identify and understand the noun it modifies (i.e., what time is
"the time"), the appositive phrase is classified as "restrictive," and it limits the potential
period to which "the time" might refer. See REDBOOK, 1.6(c) at 6-7. Because "by any
legal means" does not modify "the time," it cannot modify a lesser-included aspect of
that term (i.e., the restrictive modifier "at large").
Furthermore, the punctuation in the statute reveals that the two terms ("by any
legal means" and "at large") are in separate clauses within the larger, conditional
clause.

"By any legal means" is part of a dependant introductory clause, which is

separated from the subsequent independent clause by a comma 12 : "if thereafter, during
such term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from such
imprisonment and

subsequently

returned

thereto,

the

time

locations is to promote clarity and flow within the clause. Id.
placement, grammatically it still modifies "release," not "at large."
11

during which

the

Regardless of its

"Thereto," as an unspecific adverb, refers back to "such imprisonment" as the place to
where the defendant is returned.
12 The independent clause reads: "the time during which he was at large must not be
computed as part of such term." I.C. § 18-309.
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defendant was at large .... " I.C. § 18-309 (emphasis added to the comma at issue).
As the two terms are in different clauses, "by any legal means" cannot modify "at
large." 13
After understanding which phrases modify which terms, the next step is to
determine whether probation meets all the conditions established in the introductory
dependant clause, so that it would fall into the category of time that is excluded from
credit awards.

It does not because probation is not "a temporary release from such

imprisonment by legal means." See id.

2.

As Probation Is Not A "Temporary" Release, It Does Not Meet All The
Conditions So That Credit May Be Denied For The Time Served Pursuant
To That Period Of Probation

As noted, ordinary definitions are used in the analysis of the terms in the
introductory dependant clause.

Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96.

Mr. Smith recognizes

that, by ordinary definition, probation is a release from imprisonment (imposed at the
pronouncement of sentence and subsequently suspended), and that probation is a legal
means to secure that release.

See I.C. § 19-2601(2). It is not, however, temporary.

The word "temporary" is ordinarily defined as "lasting for a time only."

MERRIAM-

WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, 821. Therefore, the phrase "by any legal means is temporarily
released from incarceration" is ordinarily understood to mean "by legal means is
released for a time only from such incarceration." See id.
Probation, however, is not designed to release the person from incarceration for
a time only; it is designed to release him from incarceration permanently. See, e.g.,

13

Were "by any legal means" intended to modify "at large," the sentence would need to
be rewritten so that the modifier ("by any legal means") and object ("at large") were
close together in the sentence. REDBO0K, 10.29 at 168-69 (refer specifically to the
parenthetical in the example labeled "Before" on page 169).
15

I.C. § 19-2604(1). If a probationer successfully completes his period of probation, he is
not required to return to prison. See id. Rather, when the sentencing court determines
that the defendant has satisfactorily completed the period of probation, it may:
terminate the sentence; set aside the guilty plea or conviction, dismiss the case, and
discharge the defendant; or, amend the sentence to be equivalent to the period of time
the defendant served in a penal facility prior to the suspension of his sentence, which
may then be treated as a misdemeanor. 14

I.C. § 19-2604(1).

Regardless of which

option the sentencing court opts to use, the defendant is free to leave custody and is
not required to return to prison before doing so. See id. Therefore, a term of probation
cannot be classified as a "temporary" release from incarceration or a release from
incarceration "for a limited time only." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, 821.
This distinction becomes clear when the period of probation is compared to the
grant of a furlough to an inmate.

Furloughs are a legal means which permit an

incarcerated person to be released from that incarceration so they might maintain
regular employment, schooling, and the like.

I.C. § 20-242(1 ).

However, unlike the

probationer, who is not required to return to the prison, the furloughed inmate must
return to incarceration during the time he is not participating in the activity underlying
his furlough.

I.C. §§ 20-242(3); 20-614(3).

As a result of the requirement that the

furloughed inmate return to the place of his incarceration, the release is "for a limited
time only" (i.e., the hours allotted for the employment or schooling), and thus, it is

14

In the case where the sentencing court retains jurisdiction, it is limited to only the third
option, presumably because the period of retained jurisdiction necessarily incorporates
a period of incarceration while the defendant participates in the rider program. See
I.C. § 19-2604(2). As incarceration served for that charge, the defendant is entitled to
credit for that time. I.C. § 18-309. Therefore, there must be a sentence against which
credit can be awarded.
16

"temporary." 15

As the probationer carries no such similar requirement to return to

incarceration, his release is not temporary.
Further exemplifying why probationers are not temporarily released, they have a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in remaining on probation. State v. Rose, 144
Idaho 762, 766 (2007) (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). As such, before the State
may terminate that period of probation, it must provide the defendant with certain due
process protections.

Id.

This makes probation distinctly different from temporary

releases, like furloughs, which may be revoked at any time by the Department of
Correction without providing due process protections, specifically notice and a hearing.

See I.C. § 20-242(7).

Because the probationer has this protected liberty interest in

continued release, the State cannot simply revoke probation and execute the sentence
at its discretion, like it can with a furlough. Rather, it must make a showing of proof in a
forum affording these due process protections before a period of probation may be
terminated. As such, release on probation is designed to be permanent, not temporary.
As probationary release is not temporary, the period during which the defendant
is on probation does not meet all the requirements necessary to trigger the condition
which allows for the court to deny credit. See I.C. § 18-309. Therefore, under a proper
interpretation, I.C. § 18-309 does not allow the denial of credit for the period when
Mr. Smith was in custody while on probation and adhering to the terms thereof.

As

such, it was improper for the district court to deny his motion for credit for that time. 16

15

I.C. § 18-309 would provide, therefore, that should an inmate on furlough fail to report
back after the temporary period (and thus become "at large"), he should not get credit
for the time during which he is at large. I.C. § 18-309. This is consistent with the
furlough statute, which classifies such a failure to conform to the restrictions of the
release as an "escape." I.C. § 20-242(6).
16 Even if the statute is unambiguous, the grammatical rules of interpretation still prevent
the district court from denying credit for such periods. The ordinary definition of the
17

E.

The Period During Which The Defendant Is "At Large" Only Applies To Periods
When He Has Escaped Or Absconded, Not The Entire Period Of Probation
Even if this Court determines that probation constitutes a temporary release, the

statute still does not permit the denial of credit for the period during which the defendant
was adhering to the terms of his probation. I.C. § 18-309 establishes that defendants
are to be credited for periods of incarceration and are to not be credited for periods
during which they were "at large."

Id.

However, just because probation is a legal

means of release does not mean that the probationer is at large, and so cannot receive
credit for the time on probation. Such an interpretation ignores the ordinary definition of
the term "at large" and makes an invalid equation of the period of temporary release to
the period during which the defendant was "at large." Therefore, it is an unreasonable
interpretation and must be rejected. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96.
First, this Court must consider the Legislature's choice of terms. See id. "[The
Idaho Supreme Court] assumes that the [L]egislature meant what is clearly stated in the
statute." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). In this case, the Legislature opted
to use a unique term of art-"at large"-which has a specific definition: "Free;
unrestrained; not under control <the suspect is still at large>." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
52. Where terms and phrases, such as "at large," have developed specific definitions,
the Legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of that definition. See Robison, 139
Idaho at 212. The term "at large" has developed such a specific definition. BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 52; see note 4, supra.

terms, particularly "temporarily," still indicate that, as discussed in this section, probation
does not meet all the conditions to trigger the situation for which credit is to be denied.
See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. Therefore, even under an unambiguous statute, the
denial of credit was contrary to the statute.
18

By using this particular term, the Legislature intended that it mean something
different than simply being "temporarily released from such imprisonment by legal
means." This is because when courts engage in statutory construction, they are to
favor interpretations which give meaning to every word, clause, and sentence the
Legislature chose to use. Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 900
(2008).

Reading the terms "temporarily released by legal means" and "at large" as

coextensive deprives the term "at large" of meaning, which would improperly make it
surplussage. See id; State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801,803 (1995). Had the Legislature
intended to remove the entire period during which the person was temporarily released
from the credit scheme, it would have used the same term, "temporarily released," in
both parts of the statute. 17 Instead, the Legislature chose to use a different, narrower,
term to describe the period of time for which credit is not to be awarded. See I.C. § 18309. Because it chose to use a different term with a different definition, that term must
have a different meaning in the statute. See Obendorf, 145 Idaho at 900; Martinez, 126
Idaho at 803.
Furthermore, it chose to use the term as part of a restrictive appositive phrase,

see Part (0)(1 ), supra, which means that the time for which credit may be denied is
limited to only the time "during which [the defendant] was at large." See I.C. § 18-309.
This must be the case, or else the phrase serves no purpose except to rename the
noun (i.e., the time). See REDBOOK, 1.6(b)-(c) at 6-7. As a result, it would impermissibly
become surplussage.

See Obendorf, 145 Idaho at 900; Martinez, 126 Idaho at 803.

Grammatically, the key identifying feature between a restrictive and a nonrestrictive
17

For example, "during such term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily
released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during
which he was [temporarily released] must not be computed as part of such term."
19

appositive phrase is whether the phrase is set off from the remainder of the sentence by
commas. REDBOOK, 1.6(b)-(c) at 6-7. A nonrestrictive appositive phrase, which would
simply rename the noun with nonessential information, will be offset by commas, while a
restrictive appositive phrase will not.

Id.

Because the Legislature did not offset the

phrase with commas, 18 the phrase "during which he was at large," which provides
essential information describing to which period of time the Legislature is referring, must
be a restrictive appositive phrase.

REDBOOK, 1.6(b)-(c) at 6-7.

Therefore, if the

defendant was not "at large," then there is no time for which he may be denied credit.
The Legislature's intent behind using this restrictive term and phrase to limit the
time for which credit may be denied is clarified by referring to the illustrative definition of
"at large," which reads: "<the suspect is still at large>." BLACK'S LAW D1cr10NARY 52.
This example refers to a situation where the person is not in custody, but rather, is
evading capture and at a location unknown to authorities. See id.; note 4, supra. In
fact, the Court of Appeals, specifically in regard to I.C. § 18-309, has recognized that
this is the proper use of the term: "a prisoner who escapes from incarceration should
[not] be permitted accrual of the time toward his sentence while he is at large."

Application of Chapa, 115 Idaho 439, 443 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added).

In a

similar situation, the Court of Appeals modified a district court's award of credit to deny
the award for three days, "tak[ing] into account the three days that [the defendant] was

at large following his escape." Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 172 n.2 (Ct. App.
2006) (emphasis added).

18

As such, the term "at large" does not broadly apply to all

"[T]he time during which he was at large must not be computed .... " I.C. § 18-309.
20

situations where the defendant is not incarcerated, but rather, only to those situations
where he is not in custody and his whereabouts are unknown.
In the context of probation, those conditions are only met when the probationer
absconds from supervision.

However, while Mr. Smith was conforming to the

conditions of his probation, his whereabouts were known.

(See Prior R., pp.147-48.)

He also remained in the custody of the Department of Correction throughout that time.
See§§ 19-2604(1), 20-219(1).

As such, he was never "at large," as the term is

ordinarily defined. See, e.g., Chapa, 115 Idaho at 443; Fullmer, 143 Idaho at 172, n.2;
note 4, supra.
Therefore, by examining the specific term of art the Legislature chose to use, its
intent becomes clear: the only scenario in which it intended a probationer to be denied
credit under this statute was if he absconds.

Therefore, the statute is properly

interpreted to read, "the time during which he was [absconding] must not be computed
as part of such term." I.C. § 18-309. And, pursuant to the reasonable interpretation of
the statute, denying Mr. Smith credit for the time during which he was not at large, but
rather in the custody of the Department of Correction and adhering to the numerous
restraints and controls on his freedom (which the Supreme Court recognized functioned
to restrict the defendant's actions just like incarceration), was improper. See id.
The rationales supporting this interpretation are twofold.

First, to interpret "at

large" as equivalent to "temporarily released by legal means," and so deny credit for
time served on probation, would place this statute in inherent conflict with other
sections of this statutory scheme. For example, an inmate who is granted a furlough is
temporarily released from incarceration by legal means. See I.C. § 20-242. However, if
"at large" is to be read as equivalent to the period of that temporary release, the
21

furloughed inmate would not be entitled to credit during the time he is not incarcerated
(i.e., released on furlough).

Such a result is directly contrary to the purpose of the

furlough statute, which was enacted to provide an incarcerated person serving his
sentence with the opportunity to maintain his employment or complete his education
without undue interruption from the sentence. See I.C. § 20-242(1)-(2). He was meant
to be able to serve his sentence (i.e., get credit against his sentence) while
simultaneously being released from incarceration in order to continue his employment
or education. See id. As a result, such an interpretation of the statute would create
direct discord in regard to these and similar situations.
The reason why such an interpretation is improper because the courts are dutybound, when construing statutes, to harmonize and reconcile the statutory scheme
whenever possible. Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 104 (2004);
State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 829 (Ct. App. 2010).

As this interpretation creates

discord between the statutes and a harmonizing interpretation-that only the period
during which the released inmate is not in custody (i.e., absconds) must not be
credited-is possible, the discordant interpretation should be rejected. See id. As such,
this Court should comply with its duty and adopt the harmonizing interpretation instead.
See id.

The second reason why the alternative interpretation is unreasonable is that the
Legislature has already provided that parolees are able to receive credit for the time
during which they are released from incarceration pursuant to the terms of their parole,
with such credit awarded at the discretion of the parole board.

22

I.C. § 20-228; 1998

Idaho Session Laws, ch. 327, § 2, p.1057; compare with I.C. § 18-309. 19 However,
under the discordant interpretation, probationers are prevented from receiving such
similar treatment. See Soto, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 376, 2-3. The incongruity
of maintaining such a distinction, particularly between two such similar situations, was
criticized by Judge Schwartzman soon after the Legislature made the change in the
parole statute: "If a parolee may now be able to receive some discretionary credit for
time actually spent on parole in an unincarcerated [sic] status, how much sense does it
make to not give a probationee [sic] credit for time served while actually incarcerated as
a condition of probation?"
(Schwartzman,

Judge,

State v. Jakoski, 132 Idaho 67, 69 (Ct. App. 1998)

specially

concurring)

(emphasis

in

original).

Judge

Schwartzman was particularly focused on the denial of credit for the time the
probationer served in a county jail. See id., at 67-68. However, his statement reveals
that the criticism is broader. See id. He pointed out that the jail time was a condition of
probation, which implied the broader criticism, that "it is nonsensical and improper to
allow credit for parolees who adhere to the terms of their parole, but not credit
probationers who adhere to the terms of their probation (which may include serving jail
time)." See id. Such a result creates significant discord in these two sections of the
statutory scheme. This is particularly troublesome because the two situations are so
similar that some aspects, such as the supervisory authority of the Department of

19

Of particular note in this comparison is the fact that I.C. § 20-228 provides "[f]rom and
after the issuance of the warrant and suspension of the parole of any convicted person
and until arrest, the parolee shall be considered a fugitive from justice." I.C. § 20-228.
This corresponds with I.C. § 18-309's prohibition against the award of credit for time that
the defendant is "at large" (i.e., a fugitive). See I.C. § 18-309; MERRIAM WEBSTER'S
D1cr10NARY 329. Despite that assertion, however, I.C. § 20-228 immediately goes on to
provide that the parole commission may grant credit for the time which the parolee
served on parole. I.C. § 20-228. Therefore, a similar interpretation of I.C. § 18-309 is
also reasonable.
23

Correction in both instances, are addressed in a single statute. See, e.g., I.C. § 20219(1).
Therefore,

in order to avoid the discord caused by such incongruous

contradictions in the statutory scheme, the term "at large" cannot be read to be more
than a period during which the probation absconds.

See Housel, 140 Idaho at 104;

Gamino, 148 Idaho at 829. Such an interpretation is unreasonable because it would

make I.C. § 18-309 incoherent within the context of the criminal justice system as a
whole, and therefore, such an interpretation must be rejected. See id.

F.

The Statute Is, At Least Ambiguous, And The Rule Of Lenity Requires That
Ambiguity Be Resolved In Mr. Smith's Favor
To the extent that there are multiple, rational interpretations of the terms in the

statute, specifically in regard to the terms "at large" and "temporarily released," this
statute is, at least, ambiguous as to whether credit should be given for time spent in the
custody of the Department of Correction adhering to all the restrictive terms of
probation. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96.

In such an instance, the rule of lenity

requires the ambiguity to be resolved in Mr. Smith's favor. See, e.g., State v. Anderson,
145 Idaho 99, 103 (2007).

In this case, that would mean that Mr. Smith should be

credited for the time he spent on probation adhering to the restrictions thereof.
As such, the denial of credit for the time Mr. Smith spent on probation, in the
custody of the Department of Correction, subject to the numerous restrictions on his
freedom, was improper and needs to be reversed under a proper interpretation of the
statute.
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II.
The District Court Improperly Denied Mr. Smith's Rule 35 Motion And Failed To Provide
An Adequate Record In Regard To Its Denials Of His Rule 35 Motion And Motion For
Credit For Time Served

A.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Smith's Rule 35 Motion To Correct An
Illegal Sentence And Provide A Correct Calculation Of Credit For Time Served
As "Untimely"
Rule 35 provides that motions to correct illegal sentences and motions for correct

computation of credit may be made at any time.

I.C.R. 35(a), (c).

Only requests to

correct sentences imposed in an illegal manner or pleas for leniency are limited in the
time to file. I.C.R. 35(b). Mr. Smith's motion indicated that it was filed to correct an
illegal sentence. (R., p.227.) In the brief he filed in support of his motion, he argued
that it was illegal to deny him credit for the time served on probation because doing so
violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment Rights, as well as several Idaho statutes.
(R., p.235.)

Substantively, he argued additional grounds for why the district court's

denial of credit was incorrect. (R., pp.235-47.) Under either view, however, this motion
had no time limit for filing. I.C.R. 35(a), (c). As such, the district court's denial of that
motion as "[u]ntimely" is in error. (See R., p.227.) Therefore, the district court's denial
of Mr. Smith's Rule 35 motion should also be reversed and the case remanded for a
proper calculation of credit.
As set forth in Section I, supra, Mr. Smith is entitled to credit for the time he
served on probation, adhering to the terms thereof.

Therefore, this Court should

reverse the district court's denial of his motion and remand for a proper calculation of
credit.
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B.

The District Court Failed To Issue Sufficient And Proper Orders In Response To
Mr. Smith's Motions
The district court also failed to comply with I.C.R. Rule 47 (hereinafter, Rule 47),

which requires any written orders made in response to a filed motion to be entered "on a
separate document." I.C.R. 47. This failure, in regard to the motions for early release
(R., p.176), for credit for time served (R., p.185), and for a correct computation of credit
(R., p.227), should be corrected in order to ensure both sufficiency and clarity in the
record.

For example, the district court failed to indicate whether it was denying or

granting Mr. Smith's motion for credit in its handwritten notation on the face of that
motion. (R., p.185.) Presumably, had it taken the time to generate the separate written
order required by Rule 47, it would have clearly indicated whether it had, in fact, granted
or denied the motion.
As the district court failed to provide a sufficient record, this case should be
remanded, at least to provide for a sufficient record.

Compare Turner v. State, 667

So.2d 882, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that similar handwritten notations
failed to provide an appropriate order from the trial court under Florida's rules of
appellate procedure, and so merited remand on that ground). 20 As such, Mr. Smith
would request this Court remand with instructions that proper orders be entered in

20

Both motions challenged on this ground addressed the same issue-whether he was
entitled to credit for the time on probation. It is clear that the district court did not intend
to grant Mr. Smith credit for the time he served on probation with its denials of his
motions for early release and to get a correct computation of credit. (See R., pp.176,
227.) He also indicated in his notice of appeal that his motion for credit had been
denied. (R., p.195.) As such, it is reasonable to assume that the district court will enter
written orders pursuant to Rule 47 denying the motions, and the issue regarding
whether Mr. Smith should receive the requested credit will return to this court at that
time. Therefore, in the interest of judicial efficiency, Mr. Smith would ask this Court to
consider all the issues raised at this time.
26

regard to his motion for early release (R., p.176), his motion for credit for time served
(R., p.185), and his motion to have a correct computation of credit. (R., p.227.)

CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's denial of
credit and remand this case for a proper calculation of the time for which he should
receive credit. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this case be remanded so that

a proper and sufficient record might be established.
DATED this 24 th day of April, 2012.

L/.L

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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